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1. Recessions 
 
In this paper we wish to explore the determinants of the Post-Communist recessions, 
i.e. recessions experienced during the 1990s by the 27 countries that emerged from 
the Soviet block. As will be discussed in detail, most of the transition theory focused 
on the related but different concept of ‘transitional recession’1, i.e. the recession 
following the implementation of liberalisation programme.  
Empirically, this ‘transitional recession’ is a part, but only a part of the experience of 
post-Communist economies. From empirical studies on economic growth in the 
region we know that the ‘transitional recession’ was a real phenomenon, however it 
corresponded to the ‘J-curve’ path of output, i.e. was relatively short and led to 
subsequent higher growth. In some countries, this short transitional recession was the 
only recession that was experienced. In Poland the recession was two years long. In 
the neighbouring Ukraine (and in Moldova) it took ten years for the economic growth 
to recover. 
Moreover, the timing of recessions did not always coincide with the introduction of 
the core liberalisation programme. Out of twenty seven former command economies 
in Europe and the former Soviet Union, twelve went into recession already in 1989, 
twelve more joined in 1990 and virtually all post-Communist economies were in 
recession in 1991 (see Table A.1 at the end of this paper). More importantly, those 
were not ‘transitional’ recessions: twenty five economies went into recession before 
the stabilisation or liberalisation programmes were implemented. The only two 
exceptions are Hungary and Poland. In Hungary, GDP growth reported for 1989 was 
close to zero, i.e. 0.4%. Stabilisation programme was introduced in March 1990 and 
the economy went into recession in the same year. However, the level of liberalisation 
corresponding to Polish reforms of 1990 was reached in Hungary only two years after 
the recession started, i.e. in 1992.2 That leaves us with Poland as the only single 
example where beginning of recession coincided with introduction of the full 
liberalisation and stabilisation programmes. Indeed, in 1989, the Polish GDP seemed 
                                                          
1 The term may be attributed to Janos Kornai (1995). 
2 This delay led to (now mostly obsolete) discussion of ‘gradualism’ versus ‘big bang’, where Hungary 
was taken as an example of the former, and Poland of the latter. A sampling of that early discussion 
can be found in Portes (1993). 
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to be still growing at the rate of 2.8%,3 albeit inflation was soaring and it is disputable 
how long the growth could last. The stabilisation and liberalisation programmes were 
introduced in January 1990, and the economy immediately went intro recession, 
which lasted for just over two years; as it turned out later, the shortest period as 
compared with any other transition economy.  
This short account is intended to reiterate that the command economies were already 
in crisis in late 1980s. Liberalisation introduced in early 1990s was a response to this 
crisis. While it made recession worse for a short period of time, it also led to faster 
recovery. 
 
2. Empirical literature 
 
There are two lessons emerging from the empirical literature on economic growth in 
the region: (i) both transitional reforms and stabilisation was conducive to economic 
growth in the longer run, however (ii) the reforms resulted in J-curve short term 
output paths as did some types of stabilisation policies (but not all).  
We will discuss those two results in turn. 
Econometric evidence on output response to reforms can be found in seven published 
studies on economic growth in the region based on panel data: Loungani and Sheets 
(1997), Selowsky and Martin (1997), Christoffersen and Doyle (2000), De Melo et al. 
(2001), Falcetti et al (2002), Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (2003) and Merlevede 
(2003). All the studies are consistent in finding that overall impact of reforms (as 
measured by EBRD indicators) on economic growth is positive. At the same time, the 
reforms result in temporary output slump in the year of implementation, which is 
counterbalanced by lagged effects. Thus, in the six studies which allow for lagged 
effects (i.e. except for Loungani and Sheets 1997), we have the same consistent 
pattern of J-curve type response of output to reforms. 
                                                          
3 For both Hungary and Poland, the output statistics are as reported by the corresponding Central 
Statistical Offices for GDP, not for the Net Material Product. The latter measure, standard under the 
old regime, excludes a major part of the service sector. The difference is not trivial. For both countries 
use of NMP would show recession in 1989 (the latter statistics is sometimes being confused with GDP 
and made its way into some Western reports, in disguise). 
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The second set of results relates to the link between macroeconomic stabilisation and 
output. In the studies quoted above, empirical results show that macroeconomic 
instability (measured either as high inflation or low (negative) government budget 
balance) affects growth negatively. There is no indication of the short term positive 
correlation between inflation and growth (and of negative impact of disinflation on 
growth). Campos and Corricelli (2002) summarise the existing evidence in light of 
theoretical insights, noting: 
 
… based on the experience of programmes implemented in developing market economies, 
stabilisation per se should not have caused a sharp fall in output (Ibid., p.819) 
 
All this evidence, still does not exclude the possibility that some types of stabilisation 
programmes could have negative impact on growth. As far as we know, the only 
published econometric evidence on impact of stabilisation programmes, which 
distinguish between different types and based on cross-country panel of transition 
economies, comes from Christoffersen and Doyle (2000). They did not find any 
systematic, general impact of stabilisation on output (other than positive via 
disinflation), This can be easily corroborated by evidence provided in Table A.1 
below. The only two countries, where the beginning of recession coincided with 
stabilisation, were again Hungary and Poland. However, Christoffersen and Doyle 
(2000) found one significant effect: where sharp disinflation (inflation more than 
halved in one year) was implemented under the presence of pegged exchange rate 
regime, the policy had a negative effect on growth. Even in this case however, the 
longer run impact of these programmes should be positive, as short term negative 
effects may be counterbalanced by subsequent positive impulse of macroeconomic 
stabilisation on growth. 
 
In the next section (3) we will consider theoretical explanations of the link between 
the systemic reforms and output path. In subsequent Section 4, we wish to focus on 
the empirical analysis: which set of factors explains the length and depth of recessions 
experienced by the group of post-Command economy countries. Because those 
recessions did not necessary coincide with ‘transitional’ recessions proper (i.e. those 
resulting from the systemic reforms, which have short-lived negative impacts on 
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growth), a better name to use would be ‘post-Communist’ recessions. As will be 
argued, it is not transition and stabilisation, but absence of those which imposed the 
most serious economic cost on the group of countries we consider. 
 
3. Theoretical literature on ‘transitional recession’ 
 
As already discussed, the ‘transitional recession’, triggered by liberalisation, even if 
short lived was a real phenomenon and of considerable interest from the economic 
theory point of view. It is not frequent that a large group of countries decide to 
dismantle the command economy. And again, the timing of this systemic transition is 
best represented by liberalisation. Institutional reforms took longer to implement, and 
empirically, it was typically liberalisation, which coincided with a large one-off 
decrease in output (even if the recession started earlier, as already discussed). 
Before discussing the explanations of the ‘transitional recessions’, it is worth to notice 
two themes featuring frequently in the literature, where the term ‘transition’ not 
necessary applies: 
Firstly, the evidence discussed already shows that some types of stabilisation 
programmes had temporary negative impact on GDP growth. However, the 
experience of the transition economies does not differ here from other middle income 
market economies, Latin America in particular. The transition countries inherited 
monetary overhangs resulting from initial price controls, which imply that 
liberalisation could result in one-off price jump, which could trigger a policy response 
in the form of stabilisation programmes. However, the macro disequilibria to be 
addressed were more deeply rooted than just the effects of price liberalisation. And 
whatever the initial reason, the stabilisation programmes were addressing the macro 
disequilibria which were qualitatively not very different from any other market type 
economies. Generally, it is not the macro policy, where the transition experience has 
some unique features. 
Secondly, foreign trade shock were real, but should not be related to individual 
liberalisation programmes. Disappearance of trade structures co-ordinated by CMEA 
(Council of Mutual Assistance) and disruption of the intra-Soviet trade within the 
former Soviet Union (fifteen out of twenty seven transition countries were Soviet 
republics in 1989) led to trade shocks. Thus, more trade dependent countries were 
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more affected by recessions. A possible link to liberalisation is that the old 
administrative foreign trade links were disrupted, before they could be substituted by 
new ones based on international market mechanisms. However, there are two 
problems with this line of argument. Firstly, the effects would appear regardless of 
liberalisation in a given country – it is sufficient than the neighbouring countries 
liberalise. And secondly, a more important effect there is not that the old co-
ordinating mechanism was replaced by market structures. In fact, trade openness was 
associated with better trade and output performance, as exemplified by Estonia, and 
several other Central European countries. The problem was rather that the old co-
ordinating mechanism was not replaced by international market arrangement but by 
new set of barriers and inefficient exchange rate mechanisms, in particular in the CIS 
countries (see Gros and Steinherr 2004). 
 
This leaves us with explanations of ‘transitional’ recessions that may be grouped 
under two main headings; those may be seen more as complementary then 
alternatives: 
 
1. Shocks in relative prices resulting from price liberalisation. That is typically 
exemplified by the two following channels. The first one relates to the elimination 
of soft-budget constraint (i.e. introducing ‘hard’ credit and reduction/elimination 
of budgetary subsidies to enterprises), which results in a different set of producer 
prices (Blanchard 1997). The second channel relates to the direct shift of prices of 
energy (and energy-intensive products) towards world prices (even if energy 
prices were not liberalised fully, the prices were at least partially adjusted 
upwards) (McKinnon 1993). There are two possible mechanisms linking change 
in producer prices with recession. Firstly, financial market imperfections may 
imply that firms with good projects have no resources to expand quickly, while 
firms with bad projects are immediately hit and reduce output. Recession follows 
(Calvo and Coricelli 1992). Secondly, firms hit by price shocks are unable to 
adjust their labour costs downwards. Reduction in both employment and 
production follows (Blanchard 1997). 
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2. Disorganisation. Dismantling of the command economy mechanism leaves 
individual firms with a large set of bargaining problems with their suppliers and 
customers. In some areas, market equilibrium prices may quickly emerge, but in 
some other informational barriers may lead to strategic behaviour and inefficient 
outcomes, where some productive links will be broken down. In short, while new 
co-ordination mechanism based on prices emerges ultimately, it may take time to 
establish it, and output fall is more likely in industries with a large number of rigid 
connections between producers of intermediate goods. This empirical prediction is 
confirmed by Blanchard and Kremer (1997). 
 
In the Blanchard’s (1997) version, the first model (under the name of ‘reallocation’) 
relies on the labour market mechanisms not on the financial sector imperfections. It 
starts with the distinction between those firms, which lost from shift in relative prices, 
and those which gained. In the first category we find firms that were subsidised under 
the old system, in the second those which had to pay the cost of it in terms of higher 
taxes. The losers (the ‘old’ sector) may be identified with the state sector, and the 
gainers with the new private sector or with firms restructured after privatisation 
(‘new’ sector). Alternative categorisations are possible: ‘old sector’ label may be 
attributed to firms controlled by insiders (both ‘old’ state and privatised to insiders) 
and ‘new sector’ to firms, where either outsiders or owners-managers (entrepreneurs 
in case of small firms) are in control. The key economic distinction relates to the fact 
that the ‘new’ sector is more productive – in the Blanchard’s model, the quality of a 
representative consumer good produced is higher, and old equilibrium was supported 
by the fiscal distortions (subsidies and taxes) and resulting price distortions. 
Elimination of the fiscal intervention makes the prices of the goods produced by both 
sectors equal, and the consumer demand shifts towards the ‘new’ sector due to the 
positive quality differential. If wages in the ‘old’ sector adjust downwards, there are 
no negative effects on employment and production, otherwise transition leads to an 
initial increase in unemployment and a slump in production. 
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In Calvo and Coricelli version (1992, 1993) companies face shift in costs resulting 
either from removal of subsidies or higher prices of energy-related products. ‘Bad’ 
firms (those for which command economy distortions were favourable) are hit 
immediately and reduce production while good firms cannot adjust fast, as they face 
credit constraints (and investment processes take time). Recession follows: 
 
 Over time, firms can accumulate monetary balances and converge to the optimal level 
of output that would have been reached in the presence of perfect credit markets. 
Accordingly, the implied behaviour of output would follow a U-shaped pattern. An 
implication of this view is that output decline should be accompanied by a decline in 
productivity. Moreover, real wages would drop as well, as enterprises attempt to generate 
liquidity to purchase inputs (Campos and Coricelli 2002, p. 820). 
 
That is, there is a direct link between the credit market and labour market 
explanations. However, the Blanchard’s model imposes stronger labour market 
rigidity assumptions that the Calvo and Coricelli’s model. In the latter, wages can 
adjust downwards, and in fact this is to be expected, along the lines quoted above: 
credit constraint implies that it is not only in the interest of producers of ‘bad’ 
products, but also of ‘good’ producers to cut wages, temporarily. However, wages can 
neither go down to zero, nor become negative (so that firms could borrow from the 
employees). Workers are restricted by their access to credit and by their risk 
preference, and have some non-negative reservation wage. Thus, there are limits to 
which the internal finance can be generated by drop in real wages (wages cannot 
become negative, for instance).4 That explains why firms producing ‘good’ products 
cannot accumulate financial resources quickly enough to expand production. 
However, recession results also from the fact that wages in firms producing ‘bad’ 
products cannot cut wages deep enough to match the impact of slump in product 
prices, and the latter effect is parallel to the Blanchard’s model. 
 
                                                          
4 Here, wage cuts is one mechanism and wage arrears is another. Wage arrears can be seen as 
equivalent to borrowing from workers. Modelling of this issue is provided by Earle and Sabirianova 
(2000). Se also, Desai and Idson (2000, Chapter 8). 
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The second model (disorganisation) has been presented by Blanchard and Kremer 
(1997) and Blanchard (1997) in two related versions, either describing a 
representative production chain or a representative firm facing a number of suppliers. 
In both cases, previous to liberalisation, the co-ordination was imposed by the 
economic administration of the command economy system. Liberalisation leads to 
outside opportunities being open to all parties involved. The possible inefficiency 
results from the fact that the suppliers and purchasers of intermediate products have to 
negotiate prices. Bargaining under informational asymmetries may lead to inefficient 
outcomes, where efficient links are broken, as the suppliers may chose alternative 
trade partners, even if the real opportunity cost exceeds the benefit. 
 
With benefit of the hindsight, what can we say about the empirical explanatory power 
of the alternative ‘transitional recession’ models? The first issue to consider is wage 
flexibility. Contrary to some expectations, wages turned out to be flexible 
downwards, at least during the ‘transitional recessions’. That is consistent with the 
model stressing financial constraints and inconsistent with the model stressing labour 
market rigidities. However, additional theoretical insights may be gained from a 
reference to the labour controlled model of enterprise, of which state firms at the 
onset of transition could be clear exemplification. An expected result is that while 
employment is less flexible, wages may in fact be more flexible in the state firms 
during the recession. Here, first argument hinges on the impossibility of complete 
inter-temporal contract between owners (or managers) and employees in private 
firms. In the latter, workers may be unwilling to accept wage cuts, because they 
cannot be guaranteed to participate in future rents resulting from successful 
restructuring. The problem may be easier to overcome in workers owned companies. 
Secondly, insider ownership may be seen as equivalent to the ‘efficient contract’ 
solution, where not only wages but also employment is taken into account in firms’ 
optimisation decisions and the employment effects of higher wages are taken into 
account, in contrast to no-coordination, ‘right to manage’ models. The argument, 
which highlights a counter balancing negative effect however is that the worker may 
discount the future gains more than the private investor, and therefore may opt for 
higher wages now at cost of future gains. This again, assumes imperfect financial 
markets, demonstrating how strong the link between the finance and labour 
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perspectives is. In general, however, wage flexibility turned out to be high, either due 
to the financial reasons, as presented by Campos and Coricelli (2002) cited above, or 
due to the implications of the effective employee control in the state sector (with the 
first two effects out weighting the third one).5 
Secondly, the additional empirical support for the financial explanations of the 
‘transitional recession’ comes from the well documented fact that underdeveloped 
financial intermediation had been one of the few most characteristic features 
distinguishing the transition economies from other (Gros and Suhrcke 2000; Gros and 
Steinherr 2004).  
We now turn to empirical evidence. 
 
4. New empirical results: initial conditions, wars, stabilisation, liberalisation 
and the Post-Communist slump in output 
 
We intend to look for a possible set of factors that can explain the recessions 
experienced by the post-Communist economies during the 1990s. There is more than 
one way of measuring the economic cost of recession. Moreover, presence of serious 
measurement errors (Aslund 2001) calls for the use of a battery of alternative 
indicators, to check the robustness of results. We propose to focus on four alternative 
measures.  
 
The first one is the depth of recession, as measured by the ratio of the lowest value of 
output to its 1989 value. For most countries, the indicator was provided directly by 
EBRD (1999, Table 3.1, p. 63), however, here it was verified for the two countries 
which were still in recession in 1999 (Ukraine and Moldova) and supplemented for 
the missing countries (Bosnia and Hertzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro) using 
EBRD and World Bank statistics. The indicator shows that the recession has been  
most shallow in the Czech Republic and the most dramatic in war-torn Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
The second measure relates to the length of recession. Here, the range of outcomes 
varies between two years for Poland and ten years for the neighbouring Ukraine and 
also Moldova.  
                                                          
5 For a general discussion of the employee control during the transition, see Earle and Estrin (1996). 
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The third measure is a close correlate. Instead of the length, it measures the time span 
between 1989 and the exit from recession. Thus, while the former measure shows 
lower values for countries that entered recessions later, the latter is defined by the 
timing of the final entry on the post-Communist positive growth path. The indicator 
can be easily computed from the fifth column of Table A.1. It has some advantage 
over the previous one, if we take into account that the early output statistics may be 
more problematic for some of the transition economies, and in contrast there is little 
measurement error related to timing of exit from recession. 
Finally, the fourth indicator is a crude proxy for the overall cost of the recession, as 
measured by a combination of both depth and length. It is calculated as a product of 
the depth of output slump in the lowest point and the length of recession.6 
 
The set of explanatory variables used is based on information provided in Tables A.1 
and A.2.  
We follow the existing research tradition, where the timing of beginning of transition 
is interpreted as equivalent to the introduction of some basic set of liberalisation 
measures. This approach is used in more recent of the empirical studies quoted above, 
in particular in De Melo et al. (2001), Falcetti et al. (2002), Merlevende (2003), 
where the time dimension is adjusted taking the starting point to be when the basic set 
of liberalisation measures was implemented. Similar approach is presented by 
Blanchard (1997). However, the most explicit discussion of measurement and 
empirical application of the threshold level of reforms can be found in earlier work by 
De Melo and Gelb (1997). We follow this tradition, where reforms are split along two 
dimensions: liberalisation and institutional reforms. For sake of comparability, we opt 
for a measure used in empirical studies discussed above, and based on the same set of 
indicators, namely on a simple average of the three EBRD indicators, measuring (i) 
price liberalisation, (ii) external trade liberalisation, (iii) small privatisation and 
freedom of entry. Liberalisation threshold is defined as time when this average 
reaches 3 (which is equivalent to the Polish score in 1990). The data comes from 
Falcetti et al. (2002) and EBRD (1994-2004) taking into account that the price 
                                                          
6 When divided by two, it gives a rough measure of the area of output loss, but this additional 
transformation is spurious – it is just a linear transformation, not affecting estimation results in any 
other way. 
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liberalisation indicator was re-defined by EBRD from 2003 onwards, with new value 
of 4 being equivalent to the old value of 3 (we rely on old definifition). One may note, 
that using this criterion, at time of writing, there was no liberalisation in Belarus, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. EBRD indicators cover institutional reforms as well. 
However, unlike liberalisation, those were spread over a longer period of time. 
Moreover, the theoretical arguments linking output slumps with reforms relate to 
liberalisation components. 
Stabilisation dates are taken from EBRD (1999). However in few cases, where the 
repeated attempts at stabilisations were undertaken (i.e. the first programme was 
unsuccessful), the date of latest programme is used.  
Timing of both liberalisation and stabilisation programmes is measured in the 
following way. In both cases, we divided the observations roughly into two halves, 
creating dummy variables, which represent ‘early’ and ‘late’ implementation of the 
liberalisations and stabilisations correspondingly. The resulting cut-off point divide 
stabilisation programmes into those introduced in 1992 or earlier and those 
implemented after 1992. For liberalisation, the corresponding year is 1994.  
Our motivation to construct the variables this way, is to minimise the problem of 
endogeneity of reforms. We intend to explore how early implementation of 
liberalisation and stabilisation measures affected recessions over the long term. In 
contrast, any measure based on subsequent paths of reforms may be endogenous, i.e. 
affected by economic growth. 
Next, we have a set of variables corresponding to the initial conditions.7 Firstly, we 
have ‘years under communism’, an indicator based on the assumption that the longer 
time span under the old regime, the more distortions were introduced and the more 
difficult is the return to a market economy. With this measure, some degree of 
arbitrariness is unavoidable; for consistency, we follow figures by Fisher and Sahay 
(2000), being fully aware that there may be reasons to modify some of their entries. 
Next measure – an indicator of the rich natural resource base is also based on the 
same source, but measurement appears less problematic. The next three indicators of 
initial conditions are based on De Melo et al. (1997). The first two are measures of 
repressed inflation and the black market exchange premium at the onset of reforms. 
Unfortunately, both cannot distinguish between half of the observations in our 
                                                          
7 The list of the indicators is not complete. See Campos and Coricelli (2002) for further discussion.  
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sample; that is, the reported value is exactly the same for the fifteen countries 
emerging from the former Soviet Union. For this reason both measures may be 
strongly correlated with some other omitted variables and therefore remain 
problematic. The third indicator – a measure of trade dependence on other command 
economies is better in this respect, as it distinguishes between the former Soviet 
republics, based on data on intra-Soviet trade.  
Finally, we wish to explore if being the former federation counts; the corresponding 
indicator takes a value of one for countries emerging from Soviet Union, Yugoslavia 
and Czechoslovakia, and zero otherwise. We also investigated if the narrower 
dummy, for CIS only, captures some specific influences. 
 
4.1 Results 
 
Most of the indicators correlate with recession measures with expected sign. The 
strongest effect links war with depth of recession (correlation between the war 
dummy and the lowest/1989 output ratio is -67%).8 Similarly, both time spent under 
communism, and inherited disequilibrium (repressed inflation, black market exchange 
rate premium) correlate with recession well. Initial trade dependency made things 
worse, as more open economies were more exposed to the initial disruptions in trade. 
Being a federation does not have such a clear impact on recessions, due to the fact 
that the indicator includes three successful economies: Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. Being a CIS country on the other hand is significantly linked with 
recession.  
Possibly, the most interesting results relate to timing of liberalisation and stabilisation 
programmes. First, the time discrepancy between stabilisation and liberalisation 
correlates with recession indicators. When we take the absolute value of the time 
difference between the stabilisation and liberalisation programmes, and correlate it 
with the lowest/1989 ratio of output, the correlation coefficient is -29%. However, the 
effect is dominated by simple measures of timing of both programmes. Correlation 
coefficient between early stabilisation (as defined above) and the lowest/1989 ratio of 
output is a hefty 54%; for early liberalisation it is almost the same at 53%. 
                                                          
8 However, a word of caution is needed. Aslund (2001) argues that countries experiencing wars were 
not only affected by the collapse of output, but also by the collapse of output statistics. 
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Unambiguous result is that early introduction of both liberalisation and stabilisation 
programmes correlates with less serious recession. 
 
Things become more challenging however, as soon as we move from bivariate 
correlations to multivariate regression models. The sample is small, and does not 
allow for models with larger number of variables. Moreover, results are sensitive to 
specification due to multicollinearity. What emerges from regression analysis is that 
war remains a single variable with a clear and robust impact on the depth of recession 
and therefore on the overall cost of recessions, but not on the length of recessions.  
Next in ranking come three factors: timing of stabilisation, timing of liberalisation and 
initial trade dependence. However, here multicollinearity between liberalisation and 
stabilisation measures becomes a problem. While, when measured by simple 
correlation, the link between timing of liberalisation and recession was almost as 
strong as the link between timing of stabilisation and recession, as soon as we move 
to the multivariate regression settings, the effect of early liberalisation becomes 
dominated by early stabilisation.  
Why is the positive impact of early stabilisation so strong? Delay in successful 
stabilisation programmes was itself an indicator of the more fundamental problems 
with the fiscal side, i.e. problems with tax collection, tax structure, and control over 
public expenditures. All these reflect the most important aspects of inadequate 
institutional reforms. One may also note that those issues are not captured by the 
EBRD indicators of insititutional reforms, as those do not cover fiscal issues (apart 
from one important dimension, i.e. ‘soft budget’ constraints for firms). 
 
Table A.3 presents regression results. The reported models, are only those 
corresponding to the set of explanatory variables, which prove most significant and 
robust to specification. As mentioned, the effect of timing of liberalisation tend to be 
dominated by other variables for the depth if recession, where the impact of war and 
initial conditions (initial trade dependence on other command economies) is most 
critical.  
However, as one would expect, initial conditions have smaller impact on the length of 
recessions, which is clearly dominated by stabilisation (equations (3) and (5)) and less 
clearly by liberalisation (equation (4)). Impact of initial conflicts (war) on the length 
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of recession is highly insignificant (in contrast to its impact on the depth of recession) 
and the corresponding variable is not included in reported specifications. 
One we combine both dimensions into one proxy of the cost of recessions, timing of 
both stabilisation and liberalisation seem to dominate the impact of initial conditions, 
with the negative impact of war remaining significant. 
Generally, early stabilisation comes across as the significant predictor associated 
negatively with both the length and the depth of recession. We did additional checks, 
constructing a continuous variable representing exact timing of stabilisation and it  
worked equally well. Early liberalisation has also positive impact making recessions 
shorted, but does not come across as a significant predictor of the depth of recessions. 
In contrast, initial conditions count for the depth of recession, and far less for the 
length of recession. Specifically, the more open was a given economy to its 
Communist trade partners, the more serious was the effect of initial disruption in the 
trade patterns and contamination coming from neighbouring economies facing their 
own crises. This effect was particularly serious for smaller post-Soviet Union 
republics affected by initial slump in Russia, as demonstrated by Christoffersen and 
and Doyle (2000). Again, the effect of initial trade patterns on the depth of recession 
is robust and significant. Finally, the last dimension that emerges as very robust 
predictor of the depth of recession is the war indicator. It has also significant impact 
on the aggregate measure of the cost of recession. 
 
Finally, in Table A.4, we present an alternative approach, where direct 
interdependence between the depth and length of recession is taken into account in a 
seemingly unrelated regression model. In this context, we return to the liberalisation 
indicator, which significance was slashed due to multicollinearity in the OLS 
regression models. The specification presented includes indicators of early 
stabilisation, early liberalisation and the war dummy. Here, early stabilisation seems 
to make the recession shorter by 2.4 years, and the effect is significant. It has no 
significant effect on the depth of recession. On the other hand, early liberalisation 
reduces the depth of the slump in output by 13% on average, but has no significant 
impact on the length of recession. And again, war leads to more serious slump, but its 
impact on the length of recession is highly insignificant (with wrong sign). 
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To conclude. We know from the empirical literature on the GDP dynamics in 
transition economies that both liberalisation and some types of stabilisation 
programmes led to contemporaneous dip in output followed by strong recovery (J-
curve effects). This is consistent with the results presented here. Economies which 
introduced effective stabilisation and liberalisation programmes early suffered less 
from the post-Communist recessions. However, the initial conditions were also 
important. More open, smaller economies suffered more, as they were more affected 
by the initial disruption in trade patters, after the Soviet block disintegrated.  
And finally, war is not good for growth. Czechs and Slovak who decided to separate 
without a single shot being fired, did much better than former republics of Yugoslavia 
(apart from Slovenia) and some of the former Soviet republics. 
 
5. Evaluation 
 
We intend to make a link between our results and the theoretical literature on 
recessions. Out focus will be on Blanchard-Kremer (1997). The first think however is 
to consider the empirical evidence provided by these authors. 
Based on input-output tables for nine transition economies, they construct the index 
of complexity of production structures and find that it correlates with recession, 
controlling for an appropriate set of other variables.  However, the problem with the 
estimations provided by Blanchard and Kremer (1997) is that we are unable to 
distinguish between the effects of full liberalisation and those of some partial reforms. 
In fact, their sample (Moldova, Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Belarus, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Albania, Russia) relates to economies, which were not in the 
group of fast reformers at the time the data was collected.  
Blanchard and Kremer (1997) notice the difference between the group of countries in 
the dataset used for econometric estimations and the Central European economies. 
They present additional OECD data showing that shortages of materials were no 
longer the major constraint for producers in Central Europe (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland) in contrast to economies like Russia or Bulgaria, which still 
experienced serious problems.  
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However, their provisional explanation is that the differences between the two groups 
of countries result from initial conditions, not from differences in economic policies 
and reforms. The two initial conditions they mention relate to the degree of 
centralisation in industrial structures and enterprises (and therefore more 
specialisation leading  to negative impact of disorganisation) and to the distance to the 
main EU markets and volume of trade, which decease a possibility to alleviate the 
problems of specificity (Ibid., p.1122). 
The first argument (centralisation) may be valid, the second (trade links) seems to be 
partly invalid, as demonstrated by the estimates reported earlier: more open 
economies suffered more not less from recessions – the negative effect of breaking 
the existing trade links was stronger than the positive effect of overcoming 
specificity.  
More importantly however, the main contribution of our results may be to show that 
is not the difference in initial conditions, but in timing of the basic set of liberalisation 
measures and stabilisation that may be the key dimension explaining the post-
Communist recessions. From the SUR regression reported earlier, we may see that 
early introduction of full liberalisation was linked to more shallow output slump (with 
the estimated difference being 13% of the 1989 GDP value). 
All this does not invalidate the Blanchard and Kremer (1997) model, it may suggest 
however, the instead of being a general model of ‘transitional recession’ it may in fact 
be a more narrow model of disorganisation under partial liberalisation conditions. 
There are two possible lines of argument here. 
Firstly, one may notice that liberalisation accompanied by the private sector growth 
has two dimensions. The first one is that the set of available transactions for existing 
suppliers expands, which may lead to a break down of existing production chains and 
decrease in the old sector output and recession, along the lines discussed above. The 
second effect however is the creation of new suppliers, which is likely to work the 
other way round: the increase in the number of suppliers is likely to decrease 
specificity and hold up problems, provide alternative opportunities for producers and 
thus increase output. In fact, Blanchard and Kremer (1997) notice a major important 
channel that may operate this way, that is, the availability of external options 
provided by foreign trade. However, the issue links more to liberalisation than initial 
conditions. While initial trade dependence had a negative effect (breaking down of 
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old links), it is trade liberalisation and openness which led to new connections being 
established in place of old ones. More generally, to the extent that the entry of new 
suppliers takes time, the first (negative) dimension could still dominate early in 
transition; the second however, may prevail later on (provided there is sufficient 
freedom of entry). From this perspective, the recovery is brought not just by the 
efficient completion of the search and bargaining process aimed at the new 
equilibrium set of prices, but also, or even more importantly by entry of new 
suppliers. 
A second argument, which would link the model to incomplete liberatisation is 
slightly different. Some prices along the production chain may be still controlled, 
while freedom of contract may be introduced early. That makes outside options more 
attractive, another words, a disrupting effect of partial liberalisation may be more 
serious than that of full liberalisation. For that reason, incomplete liberalisation may 
lead to the outcomes, where a combination of selective price controls and new outside 
options (including underground economy) lead to long lasting disruption. A good 
exemplification of that may be the situation which developed in the CIS area with 
underpriced energy coupled with inadequate control over sale decisions of 
enterprises, including illegal export (see Gros and Steinherr 2004). 
In general, it is likely that the disorganisation mechanism was one of the sources of 
‘transitional recessions’, but had even more serious negative effects in case of partial 
liberalisations and incomplete transitions. To reiterate the empirical result: 
‘transitional recessions’ caused by liberalisation were J-curve type phenomena. Slow 
liberalisations (i.e. partial liberalisations) and late stabilisations led to more prolonged 
and deeper slumps in output. 
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Appendix A. Data and Estimation results 
 
Table A.1 Timing of recession, liberalisation and stabilisation programmes 
 
Country Liberalisatio
n 
date 
Stabilisatio
n 
programme 
date 
Beginning 
of  
recession 
Last year 
of 
recession 
Length 
of 
recession 
Lowest 
output / 
1989 value 
Central Europe and South Eastern Europe 
Albania 1993 1992 1990 1992 3 0.604 
Bosnia 1998 1997 1989 1994 6 0.120 
Bulgaria 1994 1997 1990 1997 8 0.632 
Croatia 1991 1993 1989 1993 5 0.595 
Czech Republic 1991 1991 1990 1992 3 0.846 
Estonia 1993 1992 1989 1994 6 0.608 
FYR Macedonia 1991 1994 1989 1995 7 0.551 
Hungary 1992 1990 1990 1993 4 0.819 
Latvia 1993 1992 1991 1995 5 0.510 
Lithuania 1993 1992 1990 1994 5 0.533 
Poland 1990 1990 1990 1991 2 0.822 
Romania 1994 1993 1989 1992 4 0.750 
Serbia 2001 1993 1989 1993 5 0.400 
Slovakia 1991 1991 1990 1993 4 0.750 
Slovenia 1991 1992 1989 1992 4 0.820 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
Armenia 1996 1994 1990 1993 4 0.310 
Azerbaijan 1998 1995 1989 1995 7 0.370 
Belarus not yet 1994 1990 1995 6 0.627 
Georgia 1996 1994 1989 1994 6 0.254 
Kazakhstan 1995 1994 1989 1995 7 0.612 
Kyrgyzstan 1994 1993 1991 1995 5 0.504 
Moldova 1995 1993 1990 1999 10 0.317 
Russia 1993 1995 1990 1998 9 0.553 
Tajikistan 2000 1995 1989 1996 8 0.392 
Turkmenistan not yet 1997 1989 1997 9 0.420 
Ukraine 1996 1994 1990 1999 10 0.365 
Uzbekistan not yet 1994 1991 1995 5 0.834 
Notes: 
(i) Liberalisation: year when the average of the three EBRD liberalisation indicators (price 
liberalisation, external liberalisation and small privatisation) takes value of 3 or higher 
(with price liberalisation indicator based on pre-2003 EBRD definition, adjusted where 
necessary to preserve compatibility). Source: EBRD (1995-2004) and Falcetti et al. 
(2002). 
(ii) Stabilisation: year when successful stabilisation programme was introduced (i.e. for 
countries with recurring high inflation episodes, the second date is reported; example: 
Bulgaria). Source EBRD (1999-2004). 
(iii) Timing of recession: based on EBRD (1995-2004) and World Bank, World Development 
Indicators (2001 dataset). 
(iv) Lowest value of output (depth of recession): based on EBRD (1995-2004). 
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Table A.2 More explanatory variables 
 
 
Country Wa
r 
Years  
under 
communism 
Rich 
resourc
e 
base 
Represse
d 
Inflation 
1987-
1989 
Black 
market 
exchange 
rate 
premium 
1990 (%) 
Trade 
Dependenc
e 
1990 (%) 
Formerly 
part of 
federation 
(USSR, 
Yugoslavia
, 
CSSR) 
Central Europe and South Eastern Europe 
Albania 0 45 0 4.3 434 6.6 0 
Bosnia 1 44 0 12 27 6 0 
Bulgaria 0 43 0 18 981 16.1 0 
Croatia 1 44 0 12 27 6 1 
Czech Republic 0 43 0 -7.1 185 6 1 
Estonia 0 51 0 25.7 1828 30.2 1 
FYR Macedonia 0 44 0 12 27 6 1 
Hungary 0 41 0 -7.7 46.7 13.7 0 
Latvia 0 51 0 25.7 1828 36.7 1 
Lithuania 0 51 0 25.7 1828 40.9 1 
Poland 0 42 1 13.6 277 8.4 0 
Romania 0 43 1 16.8 728 3.7 0 
Serbia 1 44 0 12 27 6 1 
Slovakia 0 43 0 -7.1 185 6 1 
Slovenia 0 44 0 12 27 4 1 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
Armenia 1 74 0 25.7 1828 25.6 1 
Azerbaijan 1 75 2 25.7 1828 29.8 1 
Belarus 0 75 0 25.7 1828 41 1 
Georgia 1 70 0 25.7 1828 24.8 1 
Kazakhstan 0 75 2 25.7 1828 20.8 1 
Kyrgyzstan 0 75 0 25.7 1828 27.7 1 
Moldova 1 52 0 25.7 1828 28.9 1 
Russia 1 74 2 25.7 1828 11.1 1 
Tajikistan 1 75 0 25.7 1828 31 1 
Turkmenistan 0 75 2 25.7 1828 33 1 
Ukraine 0 75 1 25.7 1828 23.8 1 
Uzbekistan 0 75 1 25.7 1828 25.5 1 
 
Notes: 
(i) War: a military conflict, either internal or with neighbouring countries (based on author’s assessment) 
(ii) Number of years a country spent under communism and indicator of rich resource base: both based on 
Fisher and Sahay (2000). 
Black market exchange rate premium and trade dependence, both based on De Melo et al. (1997). 
Trade dependence defined as average of exports and imports divided by GDP.
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Table A.3 Determinants of Post-Communist Recessions 
 
              Dependent  
              Variable 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Depth of recession: 
Lowest value of output / 
1989 value of output 
Length of recession 
in years 
Time recession ended relative to 
1989  
(year of lowest 
output + 1 – 1989) 
Cost of recession; 
a proxy calculated as: 
[1 – (lowest output / 1989 output) ]* 
(length of recession) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Stabilisation before 199
(dummy variable) 
.088 (.063)  -2.536*** (.673)  -2.143** (.674)  -1.456* (.623)  
Liberalisation before 19
(dummy variable) 
 .100 (.065)  -1.576† (.809)  -1.039 (.797)  -1.265† (.672) 
Initial trade dependenc
(def. as in Table A.2) 
-.005* (.002) -.004 (.002) .054* (.026) .042 (.033) .072* (.026) .066† (.032) .049* (.021) .036 (.024) 
War dummy 
(def. as in Table A.2) 
-.236*** (.062) -.229** (.062)     1.350* (.618) 1.437* (.649) 
Constant .699*** (.063) .648*** (.084) 5.618*** (.655) 5.891*** (.98) 5.819*** (.656) 5.796*** (.97) 1.907** (.632) 2.346* (.877) 
Number of observation 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
F statistics 12.02*** 12.37*** 10.51*** 4.37* 10.16*** 4.70* 9.35*** 8.21*** 
R-squared .611 .617 .467 .267 .459 .282 .550 .517 
Adjusted R-squared .560 .567 .422 .206 .414 .222 .491 .454 
 
Notes: 
(i) estimator: ordinary least squares 
(ii) standard errors in parentheses 
(iii) significance levels: *** .001; ** .01; * .05; † 0.1. 
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Table A.4 Determinants of Post-Communist Recessions: seemingly unrelated regression model 
 
                                                                      Dependent  
                                                                      Variables 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Depth of recession: 
Lowest value of output / 
1989 value of output 
Length of recession 
in years 
Stabilisation before 1993 
(dummy variable) 
.040 (.075) -2.418* (.989) 
Liberalisation before 1995 
(dummy variable) 
.131† (.070) -.647 (.923) 
War dummy 
(def. as in Table A.2) 
-.191** (.066) -.255 (.870) 
Constant .530*** (.055) 7.065*** (.725) 
Number of observations 27 27 
F statistics 10.42*** 4.78** 
R-squared .576 .384 
 
Notes: 
(i) estimator: Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression model 
(ii) covariance matrix for the residuals computed with a small sample adjustment 
(iii) standard errors in parentheses 
(iv) significance levels (for coefficients, based on t-statistics): *** .001; ** .01; * .05; † 0.1 
(v) Correlation of residuals from the two equations: -.367; χ2(1) = 3.629†.
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